Who buys Rwanda’s smuggled coltan? The global journey of conflict coltan from DRC to the world’s electronics
In een onderzoek dat een jaar in beslag nam, heeft de Britse NGO Global Witness de sporen van het conflictcoltan uit de DR Congo gevolgd, vanaf de mijnen in het oosten van Congo tot in de wereldwijde toeleveringsketens. In het uitgebreide rapport, dat Global Witness op 10 juni 2026 publiceerde, hebben de onderzoekers aangetoond dat Rwandese ambtenaren zich hieraan op grote schaal medeplichtig maakten, terwijl de smokkel ‘ongekende proporties’ aannam. Aangezien de coltanexport van Rwanda de afgelopen drie jaar meer dan verdubbeld is, heeft Global Witness de zeven bedrijven kunnen identificeren die 85 procent van het coltan exporteren.
De onderzoekers hebben vastgesteld dat coltan uit mijnen die worden gecontroleerd door de gewapende groepering M23 in het oosten van Congo via Rwanda de wereldwijde toeleveringsketens voor technologie wordt binnengesmokkeld.
De bevindingen roepen ernstige vragen op over de zorgvuldigheid van bedrijven en hun te groot vertrouwen in traceerbaarheids- en auditsystemen zoals ITSCI, Better Mining en het Responsible Minerals Initiative.
Al deze systemen hebben nagelaten aanzienlijke hoeveelheden conflictcoltan op te sporen en zijn er grotendeels niet in geslaagd de koppeling tussen conflicten en natuurlijke hulpbronnen in dit deel van Afrika te doorbreken.
Vrijwillige systemen en vooral de zwakke wetgeving met grote mazen in het net zijn duidelijk niet voldoende gebleken om deze smokkel aan te pakken. Zo blijft coltan veeleer een bron van conflicten.
Conflict coltan smuggled from the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is finding its way into global markets and popular consumer products, despite due diligence systems.
Who buys Rwanda’s smuggled coltan?
Where have over 2,000 tonnes of smuggled conflict coltan gone?
These looted minerals come from mines in Rubaya in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which produce 15 percent of the world’s tantalum, a key ingredient for electronic products found in smartphones, laptops and cars around the world.
The Rubaya mines have become a main revenue source for M23’s brutal warfare in DRC. Seizing vast areas of territory, the armed group backed by Rwanda’s military has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians, abducting and torturing with impunity.
But once the coltan is smuggled to Rwanda, little is known about who buys it or where it goes.
In a year-long investigation, Global Witness followed the DRC’s conflict coltan from the mines across the border and into global supply chains. We established the complicity of Rwandan officials, as smuggling reached ‘unprecedented’ levels.
With Rwanda’s coltan exports more than doubling over the past three years, we identified the seven companies that exported 85 percent of the coltan.
Through interviews with coltan smugglers, we found that at least five of these seven companies buy conflict coltan from DRC, selling it on through middlemen to smelters in China and Kazakhstan.
In the smelters, the coltan is processed into tantalum. From there, it is used to manufacture the capacitors that are essential components in electronic devices.
We found that conflict coltan may have unwittingly found its way to global brands including Microsoft, Vodafone, Sony, Amazon, Nvidia, LG Display, Ericsson, Toyota and Apple – and into products we use every day.
Around 15 years ago, a system took shape in the African Great Lakes Region that was designed to put an end to minerals financing conflict.
The recent war in DRC is a test case. Our investigation reveals that the due diligence and traceability systems have failed to break the link between conflict and natural resources.
Instead, the traceability system known as ITSCI that many international companies rely on to keep their supply chains conflict-free is being used to launder a large share of smuggled coltan.
Coltan connected to the conflict has also likely been introduced into an alternative system called Better Mining.
The Responsible Minerals Initiative’s audits have failed to detect conflict coltan in smelters’ supply chains.
Meanwhile, as the war in eastern DRC continues, the international community is failing to take significant action.
Coltan financing the conflict
Since 2023, the lucrative Rubaya mines have become a war prize for various armed groups, as they have in previous phases of the wars in DRC. The UN reported incursions in the mines throughout 2023.
In late 2023, the M23 rebel group seized control of main transport routes around Rubaya. By April 2024, it had captured the Rubaya mines, monopolising coltan exports.
Since then, coltan has become a major – if not the main – source of funding for M23.
M23’s parallel administration in North Kivu has selected M23-friendly traders to smuggle minerals to Rwanda and has run a taxation system at mining and trading sites.
Traders pay ‘taxes’ on coltan which includes 4 dollar per kilo to M23 and 3 dollar per kilo to the Rwandan government.
By collecting taxes on coltan production and trade, M23 has generated 800,000 dollar every month since May 2024 according to a UN estimate.
Key recommendations:
Companies: under the current circumstances we consider that responsible sourcing of coltan from Rwanda is almost impossible. Therefore, companies should stop buying coltan from Rwanda until M23 has withdrawn troops from the Rubaya mines unless they have thoroughly scrutinised the coltan before export by directly checking its origin and grading.
The international community should:
- suspend all export of military equipment to Rwanda;
- make any official development assistance conditional on Rwanda stopping its support to M23;
- sanction commanders of M23 and senior Rwandan officials responsible for abuses as well as companies profiteering from conflict resources.
Het volledige Global Witness-rapport over coltan kan worden gedownload op de website: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/who-buys-rwandas-smuggled-coltan-the-global-journey-of-conflict-coltan-from-drc-to-the-worlds-electronics/
Lees ook:
- The rising spotlight on coltan: Understanding its strategic importance and role in the Eastern Congo conflict https://cimic-npo.org/2025/04/18/62-011/
- Trump promises peace in Congo. But at what price? https://cimic-npo.org/2026/01/14/69-011/
- M23’s territorial advances in May – From Doha to Goma: The disconnect between diplomacy and reality in Eastern Congo https://cimic-npo.org/2025/06/24/64-003/
- Hoe kan het geweld in Oost-Congo gestopt worden? ‘De wereld blijft falen in Oost-Congo’ https://cimic-npo.org/2024/11/18/57-008/
- Why is Congo putting Apple on the spot? https://cimic-npo.org/2024/05/27/53-008/
- Protesten tegen het Westen in Congo: afleidingsmanoeuvre of legitieme actie? https://cimic-npo.org/2024/02/29/50-003/
- Partijen spelen welles-nietesspelletje: zijn er huurlingen in Kivu? Nepnieuws gooit zware rookgordijnen over Oost-Congo https://cimic-npo.org/2023/03/31/41-006/
- The deepening Crisis in Eastern DRC: An International Diplomatic Stalemate that Calls for Urgent and Stronger European Actions for Peace in the Great Lakes Region https://cimic-npo.org/2025/11/24/67-012/
- Vijf vragen en antwoorden over het WK Wielrennen in Rwanda https://cimic-npo.org/2025/09/27/65-009/
- New investigation suggests EU trader Traxys buys conflict minerals from DRC https://cimic-npo.org/2025/05/28/63-010/
- The rising spotlight on coltan: Understanding its strategic importance and role in the Eastern Congo conflict https://cimic-npo.org/2025/04/18/62-011/
- Critical minerals were once for renewables. Now they’re for war https://cimic-npo.org/2025/04/18/62-013-2/
- De Europese Unie en de oorlog in de DRC: een nooit geziene onverschilligheid https://cimic-npo.org/2025/02/22/60-011/
- Strongmen, and other bad ideas https://cimic-npo.org/2025/01/31/59-005/
- The M23 ‘version 2’ – Local stakes, motivations, perceptions, and impacts https://cimic-npo.org/2024/04/30/52-008/
