‘None Can Run Away’. War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity by All Sides in Burkina Faso
Mensenrechtenorganisatie Human Rights Watch (HRW) heeft in april 2026 een zeer uitgebreid rapport gepubliceerd over Burkina Faso, getiteld ‘None Can Run Away’. Over de ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen die sinds 2022, over het hele land, tegen burgers werden gepleegd door het Burkinese leger, door de militaire junta bewapende volksmilities (VDP), en door de islamitische gewapende groepering JNIM.
Als reactie op de systematische aanvallen van JNIM-rebellen in de Sahel hebben de militaire autoriteiten van Burkina Faso wrede contraguerrillacampagnes gevoerd die, sinds het leger op 30 september 2022 via een staatsgreep de macht greep, zich in toenemende mate tegen burgers richten.
Human Rights Watch heeft wijdverbreide oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid gedocumenteerd, begaan door Burkinese strijdkrachten samen met hun hulptroepen, de zogenaamde Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (Vrijwilligers voor de Verdediging van het Vaderland, VDP’s), en door JNIM. Uit deze bevindingen blijkt dat moorden en andere ernstige schendingen tegen burgers centraal staan in zowel de militaire tactieken van de junta als die van de JNIM.
I found my family and my neighbor’s family massacred. My wives [and] my children were dead…. The only survivor [from my family] was my 11-year-old son…. I found the bodies lying on the ground, bullets in their heads, chests, stomachs. My little one was wounded in the left leg…. I took him out of a pile of corpses. I found five other injured children from my neighbor’s family.
Samer [not his real name], a resident of Bouro village, Sahel region, February 6, 2024
On December 14, 2023, Burkina Faso military forces and allied militias killed 19 of Samer’s relatives in an attack on his neighborhood in Bouro village.
Alone, amid bodies and devastation, Samer tended to six injured children. “I started caring for them with what I had,” he told Human Rights Watch. “I made bandages with clothes I tore off. I did this all evening. There was no one in Bouro. All had fled.” Samer then took the children and fled to neighboring Mali.
Since 2016, Islamist armed groups have waged an insurgency against the government of Burkina Faso. The Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, JNIM), the dominant Islamist armed group in Burkina Faso, controls wide swathes of the country, where it attacks security forces and kills civilians and loots their property, causing thousands to flee.
“They started shooting toward all directions of the camp and I ran to find shelter,” Abdoul (not his real name), a 39-year-old farmer who lived in a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Goubré village, North Region, told Human Rights Watch in June 2024.
“People screamed, there was a lot of panic because we were about to receive food aid […] Then, they burned the truck carrying humanitarian aid.”
On May 22, 2024, JNIM fighters attacked the IDP camp in Goubré, killing over 70 civilians, allegedly to punish those who refused to join JNIM ranks.
In response to JNIM’s attacks, the Burkina Faso authorities have carried out brutal counterinsurgency campaigns that, since the military took power in a September 30, 2022, coup, has increasingly targeted civilians.
Human Rights Watch documented widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Burkinabè forces alongside their auxiliaries called the Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, VDPs) and by JNIM.
Our findings demonstrate that killings and other grave abuses of civilians lie at the heart of the junta’s military tactics as well as those of JNIM.
This report documents 57 incidents that altogether resulted in the deaths of at least 1,840 civilians in 11 regions of the country between January 2023 and August 2025.
In one such attack, on February 25, 2024, in the villages of Nondin and Soro in northern Yatenga province, the Burkinabè military summarily executed 223 civilians, including at least 56 children, accusing them of collaborating with JNIM.
In another, on August 24, 2024, JNIM killed at least 133 civilians, including dozens of children, in Barsalogho in Sanmatenga province, in retaliation against a local community it accused of supporting the VDPs.
These and the other incidents documented in this report do not fully capture the extent of the civilian toll of the conflict, as incidents often go unreported.
According to the United Nations, about two million people have been displaced by the armed conflict. Human Rights Watch found that the abuses by government forces, including VDPs, and by JNIM amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Combatants on all sides have committed the war crimes of willful killing, attacks on civilians and civilian objects, pillage and looting, and forced displacement. Government forces and VDPs also carried out the war crimes of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment and unlawful confinement.
As part of widespread or systematic attacks on civilian populations, the murder and forcible displacement by all sides amount to crimes against humanity.
Government forces have also carried out the crimes against humanity of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts.
Burkinabè military and VDPs have also committed persecution on ethnic grounds, specifically targeting the Fulani community, the country’s second largest ethnic group.
In numerous attacks across the country, they have targeted members of the Fulani community, killing entire families, burning and looting their property, and forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands from their homes.
Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, the head of Burkina Faso’s military junta and the country’s president, has rejected that the country is in an armed conflict. He has dismissed accounts from survivors of atrocities and credible reports from media and human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, as “fake” or “manipulation.”
Junta authorities have also repeatedly rejected allegations that their security forces and VDPs have committed serious crimes.
None of the commanders of the Burkinabè armed forces or JNIM who have been implicated in serious crimes, including in the cases included in this report, have been brought to justice. This includes either direct criminal liability or as a matter of command responsibility.
Human Rights Watch’s previous research, published across dozens of reports and news releases from September 2017 to May 2022, documented numerous allegations of atrocities perpetrated by all sides, provided background and context, and suggests a preexisting pattern of atrocities by all sides.
This report is the first effort to systematically document abuses in more recent years with a view to capturing the scale and impact of the conflict in Burkina Faso. It is based on a total of 450 interviews—including with 380 victims of abuses— conducted by Human Rights Watch between March 2023 and February 2026, remotely and in person in Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali.
The report also draws from verification and analysis of photographs, videos, satellite imagery, and documents shared by various organizations and individuals, as well as other publicly available information, including social media content and official reports.
Tracking Civilian Casualties and Incidents
The civilian death toll in the conflict in Burkina Faso is unknown as there is no mechanism in place to count victims. Some figures are available, such as from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)—a nongovernmental organization that collects and analyzes data on conflict worldwide—that show that at least 10,600 civilians have been killed since 2016.
However, many incidents go unreported. In addition, Human Rights Watch’s own documentation of some of the same cases, based on witness accounts, found a higher number of fatalities.
Human Rights Watch also found that the government often suppressed or downplayed conflict-related data and information by banning media outlets from critical reporting, blocking access to websites of media outlets and human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, and suspending the licenses of foreign nongovernmental organizations documenting security incidents.
This reduces conflictrelated information to the official government narrative, making accurate reporting more difficult. About 56 percent of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch did not appear in the ACLED database, underscoring the difficulties of this data collection.
Political Instability and Restriction of Rights and Freedoms
The conflict has transformed Burkina Faso’s politics and civic life. In 2022, the country faced two coups in eight months. In September 2022, President Traoré ousted Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who had been in power since January 2022, when he himself led a coup overthrowing the democratically elected president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.
Under Traoré, the junta has cited the need to counter activities from Islamist armed groups as a pretext to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms, including through arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, and unlawful conscription of political opponents, dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and judicial personnel.
Political instability has provided opportunities for Islamist armed groups to gain territory. It has also led to a deterioration of the country’s human rights situation and further entrenched impunity for serious abuses.
Abuses by the Burkinabè Military and VDPs
President Traoré has relied heavily on the VDP auxiliary forces to support the military in counterinsurgency operations. Both the military and the VDPs have committed grave crimes, including the killing and forced displacement of civilians, especially from the Fulani ethnic group, whom they accuse of supporting the insurgency.
They have fired on civilians in the path of military-escorted convoys and, during large-scale counterinsurgency operations, have massacred civilians from various ethnic groups simply because they lived in JNIM controlled areas or maintained relations with local Fulani people.
Attacks against civilians in retaliation for JNIM attacks have become a hallmark of the military’s counterinsurgency approach. Human Rights Watch has found that some attacks directed by the Burkinabè military against civilians constitute a form of collective punishment.
International humanitarian law prohibits collective punishment, which is the deliberate punishment of people for an offense that others committed.
Bouro, Samer’s village, in the Sahel region, was one of at least 16 villages and hamlets government forces and VDPs attacked in December 2023, in a punitive operation dubbed Tchéfari 2 (The Warrior’s Honey 2).
Soldiers and VDPs targeted communities living under JNIM rule, killing hundreds of civilians. The operation was an apparent reprisal for a major JNIM attack against government forces two weeks earlier in Djibo town, 30 kilometers away, in which JNIM killed several soldiers and at least 40 civilians.
The government hailed Tchéfari 2 as a “success” against JNIM, when in reality it was one in a series of atrocities against civilians.
JNIM Abuses
JNIM also targets civilians in its effort to establish territorial control over rural areas. It has used violence and coercion to subjugate populations and has punished and forcibly displaced communities that refused to submit, or that it accused of supporting government forces.
JNIM has also laid siege to dozens of towns and villages across Burkina Faso, causing starvation and illness among residents and displaced people. Under the laws of war, sieges are unlawful when they cut civilians off from food, basic necessities, and humanitarian aid.
JNIM fighters have planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads and destroyed bridges, electric lines, water sources, and communications infrastructure, harming the civilian population. They have also attacked humanitarian convoys as well as villages and towns, summarily executed civilians, and abducted women and girls.
JNIM Targeting of VDPs
Many communities have become more vulnerable to attacks by JNIM since the civilian government led by Kaboré created the VDPs in 2020, and the military junta conducted additional recruitment in late 2022.
When a community has VDPs, JNIM treats that entire community as being allied with government security forces, making the community a target for retaliation, attacks, and intimidation. JNIM has imposed sieges on localities where VDPs are present, cutting off civilians from food and necessities and limiting their freedom of movement.
Usually, JNIM has targeted VDP positions close to civilians in villages and towns. Thus, when JNIM attacked a VDP position, civilians were also exposed. “Since the VDPs were created, there is chaos,” a Burkinabè refugee in Mali said. “If a village is spared by the jihadists [Islamist armed groups] … [it] is targeted by the VDPs and the military, and if the VDPs protect a village, or if a village has VDPs, this village is targeted by jihadists.”
The Fulani Question
The Fulani people, who are spread across the Sahel region, make up about 8 percent of the population of Burkina Faso. Historically, they have been cattle herders and are predominantly Muslim.
[nvdr: De Peul, ook bekend als Pulaar, Fula, Fulani of Fulbe, vormen een zeer grote bevolkingsgroep die over heel West-Afrika verspreid leeft, traditioneel als nomadische veehouders, maar die in alle landen een minderheidsgroep is, ook in Mali werd ze de laatste jaren expliciet geviseerd door zowel de junta als de JNIM.]
Government forces and VDPs accuse Fulani people of supporting JNIM. While JNIM has focused its recruitment efforts on disaffected youth in the Fulani community, exploiting the continual degradation of the Fulani people’s pastoralist livelihood and the community’s underrepresentation in the government and military, government forces have often failed to distinguish between armed Fulani combatants and civilian members of this community.
In a February 2023 meeting with Fulani leaders, President Traoré enjoined them to “acknowledge that the epicenter of terrorism is in Fulani localities,” adding that members should “call on [their] relatives to disassociate themselves from the forces of evil [Islamist armed groups].” “Otherwise,” he said, “we will throw all our forces into the battle and there will be a lot of deaths. And it will be more complicated for your community. It’s not fun to kill, but if one has no choice, it’s death.”
Human Rights Watch found that the targeting of Fulani people stems in part from widely shared attitudes and stereotypes about their loyalties that pervade the military and the VDPs.
The highest levels of government appear supportive of military action against Fulani people based on these attitudes. The evidence includes: the geographic scope of the targeting of civilians and the increase in the intensity of anti-Fulani violence since the current junta took power; anti-Fulani statements by senior officials including the president; and many attacks that demonstrate a close coordination between the military and the VDPs across military units and layers of military hierarchy.
Taken together, this indicates that the targeting of the Fulani goes well beyond abuses by isolated, illdisciplined individuals within the ranks of the military and the VDPs, and that it may represent government policy.
A civil society activist and critic of the junta who was kidnapped and unlawfully conscripted into a VDP group told Human Rights Watch that, when he was about to be released in September 2023, he met Lt. Aziz Pacmogda, at the time head of the presidential guard. The activist said that Pacmogda asked him and another person “if we think it is easy to secure the country.”
Pacmogda said those who went to the frontlines “saw that it is the Fulani who are the terrorists. He said: ‘People say that this is discrimination, but we are going to kill them all!’”
Anti-Fulani rhetoric is widespread online, with charged social media posts frequently painting all Fulani people as members of Islamist armed groups and encouraging hate and violence against them.
Social media influencers and supporters of the junta, called “Wayiyans,” who have a large social media presence, including through groups known as BIR-C (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide de la Communication, or Rapid Communication Intervention Battalions), appear to be presenting coordinated negative messaging about Fulani people.
Civilians Targeted by Warring Parties
While government forces and VDPs have disproportionally targeted Fulani civilians, other communities have not been spared. Civilians described feeling caught between a rock and a hard place.
JNIM members threaten to kill them if they join the VDPs, are deemed to collaborate with the army, or fail to abide by JNIM’s requirements and strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law.
Meanwhile, government forces demand that civilians provide information about the presence of armed groups and carry out collective punishment, including mass killings, when people do not know or cannot provide such information.
The government’s counterinsurgency strategy appears to be failing even on its own terms: belying the government’s claims that it has regained control of territory, JNIM has been expanding its control and is present throughout most of the country. Moreover, abuses by the Burkinabè military and VDPs have fed further Islamist armed group recruitment.
Justice and Accountability
Amid the rampant abuses, the government has failed to bring to justice a single member of its armed forces for serious crimes. In November 2025, in a rare move, a military court in north-western Burkina Faso convicted six VDPs for murder and mutilating a corpse.
On a few occasions, in response to reports filed by victims and information collected by human rights groups, international organizations and the media, the authorities promised to investigate reports of mass killings of civilians by the military and VDPs but subsequently failed to do so.
Investigations by the Specialized Judicial Unit Against Terrorism-Related Crimes (Pôle judiciaire spécialisé dans la répression des actes de terrorisme), which deals with all alleged crimes by members of Islamist armed groups, have moved slowly.
Additionally, the Specialized Judicial Unit’s lack of sufficient resources has contributed to undermining suspects’ fair trial rights.
The grievous harm suffered by civilians in the conflict and the junta’s suppression of public dissent and criticism mean that Burkina Faso’s international partners—including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and their member states, and the United States—need to play a critical role to break the country’s long-standing cycles of abuses and impunity and promote accountability.
The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should open a preliminary examination into war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Burkina Faso since September 2022.
The Burkinabè junta, alongside those of Mali and Niger, announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC in September 2025. Under the ICC’s Rome Statute, withdrawal from the ICC only comes into effect one year after the state has formally notified the United Nations secretary-general of its decision.
All governments should investigate and, as appropriate, effectively prosecute individuals suspected of committing serious international crimes in Burkina Faso through the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws with international fair trial standards.
Burkina Faso’s international partners should also consider imposing targeted sanctions against abusive military and JNIM commanders across levels of their respective hierarchies when responsibilities are clearly established, including those mentioned in this report. There are limited regional avenues for victims to pursue justice.
Burkina Faso’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) means its citizens cannot appeal to the regional body’s Community Court of Justice. Given Burkina Faso’s turn away from ECOWAS, it is doubtful the government would comply with rulings from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
Burkinabè Armed Forces and JNIM Commanders Responsible for Mass Killings and Other Abuses
The research found that the gravest and deadliest attacks on civilians by the Burkinabè military and VDPs during the period covered in this report, including the massacres of hundreds of civilians near Solenzo in March 2025 and in villages and hamlets north of Djibo in December 2023, were carried out as part of large-scale operations—Green Whirlwind 2 and Tchéfari 2, respectively—coordinated across government forces and involving soldiers from the regular army and the Rapid Intervention Battalions (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, BIR), a military force involved in counterinsurgency operations, and the VDPs, all acting in tandem.
These operations indicate that the large-scale killing of civilians was a result of government policy.
For many of the incidents documented in this report, Human Rights Watch, in collaboration with the nongovernmental research group Security Force Monitor, established the chain of command identifying members of Burkinabè armed forces who had formal responsibility over the forces involved in the abuses.
Under the doctrine of command responsibility, military commanders and civilian officials may be liable for serious international crimes committed by their subordinates when superiors knew or should have known of the crimes but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish those responsible.
This report names senior military officials whom Human Rights Watch believes may be responsible for the mass killings and other abuses documented in this report as a matter of command responsibility.
As President of the Transition and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré should be impartially investigated for criminal liability for all abuses by the Burkinabè military and VDPs documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility.
Brig. Gen. Kassoum Coulibaly, Brig. Gen. Célestin Simporé, Brig. Gen. Moussa Diallo, Col. Théophile Nikièma, Col. Maj. David Kabré, and Col. Adam Néré should also be investigated as to whether they are criminally liable as a matter of command responsibility for serious abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes.
This report—which found that JNIM has systematically targeted civilians during numerous attacks across Burkina Faso—also names senior JNIM commanders implicated in abuses.
Iyad Ag Ghaly, JNIM supreme leader, and Amadou Kouffa, JNIM second-in-command, should be impartially investigated for criminal liability for JNIM abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility.
Jafar Dicko, leader of JNIM in Burkina Faso, Ousmane Dicko, Jafar Dicko’s brother and deputy commander of JNIM in Burkina Faso, and Abou Hanifa, JNIM leader in the Niger region but also operating in southeastern Burkina Faso, should all be investigated as to whether they are criminally liable for JNIM abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility.
The Burkinabè government should impartially investigate all individuals cited in this report for alleged legal responsibility for serious crimes in Burkina Faso and appropriately prosecute them in fair criminal proceedings.
The path toward a rights-respecting Burkina Faso will be difficult. In the meantime, civilians are bearing the terrible burden of both an insurgency and a military-led government that are committing atrocity crimes with impunity. Civilian protection and accountability cannot wait.
Het volledige HRW-rapport over de oorlogsmisdaden van alle strijdende partijen in Burkina Faso kan worden gedownload op de website van HRW (2 april 2026): https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/04/02/none-can-run-away/war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-in-burkina-faso-by-all
Lees ook:
- Q&A: War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity by All Sides in Burkina Faso. Questions and Answers https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/02/qa-war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-by-all-sides-in-burkina-faso
- Burkina Faso: Crimes Against Humanity by All Sides. Junta Forces Carry Out Ethnic Cleansing of Fulani Communities https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/02/burkina-faso-crimes-against-humanity-by-all-sides
- Burkina Faso’s Dubious Military Reserve Plan. Rapid Mobilization Risks Fueling Abuses, Weakening Protections https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/28/burkina-fasos-dubious-military-reserve-plan
- Burkina Faso: Islamist Armed Group Commits New Atrocities. At Least 38 Civilians Killed; Women Abducted; Property Burned https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/12/burkina-faso-islamist-armed-group-commits-new-atrocities
- Burkina Faso: Arming Civilians at the Cost of Social Cohesion? https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
- Le JNIM et le dilemme de l’expansion au-delà du Sahel https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/rpt/africa/sahel-west-africa/321-le-jnim-et-le-dilemme-de-lexpansion-au-dela-du-sahel
- Massale jihadistische aanvallen brengen Malinese junta en Russen in lastig parket https://cimic-npo.org/2026/04/29/72-009/
- Junta Burkina Faso viseert hoe langer hoe meer de pers en snoert kritische stemmen de mond https://cimic-npo.org/2025/10/24/66-012/
- Militairen aan de macht in de Sahel: de puinhoop wordt alleen maar groter https://cimic-npo.org/2023/02/26/40-001/
- Zoveelste staatsgreep in West-Afrika duidt op regio in diepe crisis https://cimic-npo.org/2022/01/28/item29-010-2/
- Waarom al die staatsgrepen? https://cimic-npo.org/2023/11/23/47-011/
- Afrika in kort bestek https://cimic-npo.org/2023/01/28/39-012/
- Should Military Leaders be Barred from Addressing the UN? https://cimic-npo.org/2023/10/23/46-011/
- Elections in Mali and Burkina Faso postponed for forever (and a day) https://cimic-npo.org/2024/06/30/54-008/
- Thinking about the Sahel (blog Bram Posthumus in vier delen) https://cimic-npo.org/2024/09/26/55-011/ https://cimic-npo.org/2024/10/26/56-003/ https://cimic-npo.org/2024/11/18/57-007/ https://cimic-npo.org/2024/12/12/58-001/
